

# *Introduction/Preface: The Meaning and Metaphors of Globalization*

## **THE BACKGROUND**

As the title of this book suggests, it examines the interdependent and interconnected global society in terms of its structural as well as functional or process characteristics. For its value implications, it is dedicated to the people—the men, women, and children as citizens of the world who make and unmake global society and are most affected by it. Whether always specifically stated, the underlying concern of this work is indeed global social change for human welfare on this planet. The term global society refers to the architecture of this world order while globalization is treated as its process dimension. Global or “globalized” structures refer to the institutions, agencies, and organizations whose missions, mandates, networks, and even the workforce with their values and attitudes are essentially global rather than local in nature. Such structures are legion in the contemporary world society. Structures such as the United Nations, the European Union, World Bank, other international agencies (both governmental and nongovernmental), regional economic zones, and multinational financial, manufacturing, sales, and service corporations immediately come to mind in this context. What these institutions do by way of their outreach activities that affect literally billions of people, multiple resources, and diverse cultures and environments are assumed to be the process aspects of global society, that is, globalization. The superimposed systemic analogy further assumes that global structures, and by implications, their processes are highly interconnected and interdependent. Sociologists of the structural-functional school and systems theorists in general have used these conceptual categories to demarcate and explain complex organizations and national societies. To the best of my knowledge, they have not been used in the explanation of what may be called a world society for obvious reasons. To consider national societies as continuous, interdependent, and interconnected systems in terms of their structures and corresponding processes itself poses enormous analytical difficulties because of their complexities and amorphous nature. These difficulties compound when the unit of analysis is the world as a whole. Such conceptualization would be unthinkable in a “pre-globalization age” when the notion of our planet as a continuous system was beyond our common perception and

consciousness, despite the fact that in some important ways it has been in the making for a long time. In the current age of globalization with modern means of communications, travel, and transfers of people, products, and services from one part of the world to others, intra-planetary connections are easier to comprehend. It is in this context that the distinction between global structures and their corresponding processes that connect them as an imperfect system is used as a heuristic device only. This is done to help simplify and enhance our understanding of a very complex phenomenon, mostly dealt with in literature simply as “globalization.”

A quick check at the Davis Library of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill confirmed over 1,100 relevant titles covering 96 pages under the term “globalization” compared to only twenty pages of 32 entries for “global society.” Unless otherwise delineated, the complementary terms of global society and globalization are often used interchangeably in the following discussion, as they appear to be so used in the Davis Library archives as well.

My interest in the subject of global society or globalization goes back to some earlier work in science and technology policy and management in the context of international and regional economic development, initially at the Indian Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR, 1963-68) and subsequently at the Administrative Staff College of India (1973-83), the Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Science and Technology (CISST, 1983-88) at Northwestern University, and the Southern Technology Council (STC) at the Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, from 1988 through 1992. The following background is meant to shed light on the contemporary history of globalization through my personal history.

As a graduate student and teaching assistant in the sociology department at the University of Pittsburgh in the early sixties I heard that the university had developed a computer assisted “something” gloriously called the “knowledge availability system” (KAS) for fast data processing. The machine or the computer behind this innovation was said to have occupied a huge room on the campus with wires and connectors of various colors and kinds. I was not interested or encouraged to go and see this machine.

CSIR–New Delhi, the place of my first professional job, was the largest system of national laboratories far surpassing in size its British counterpart after which it was fashioned. At CSIR there was nothing like a modern automatic data processing facility. We used punch cards and sorters. Even

that was considered advancement over the alternative of manually coding and tabulating data for a national opinion survey of 2,700 Indian scientists and engineers, my first large scale mail-in survey.

The term “word processing” had begun to enter some conversations in the University of North Dakota circles by the late 1960s and early 1970s, the period of my first full time faculty position. But nobody there seemed to have either seen or used a word processor. In 1973, I joined the Administrative Staff College of India (ASCI) in the city of Hyderabad, which is now one of the most prominent cyber cities in the world. There were no desktop computers (or a fax machine) at ASCI throughout my entire career of ten years there; or for that matter, at the Research Policy Institute, Lund University, Sweden where I worked as a visiting professor in 1978. I used a “desktop typewriter” for everything I wrote during those days. The Russians were making rather pathetic efforts to help ASCI build a computer center on our campus. They had arrived with bulky Russian computing machines. Due to language barriers, they did not communicate much with ASCI staff and faculty. We did see them regularly though eating lunch quietly but vigorously by themselves at the regal ASCI dining hall. All through the 1970s and the 1980s telephones services were rare and highly ineffective and unreliable in India. Telegrams had been partially replaced by telex or teleprinters in public institutions. Transparencies for overhead projectors had to be copied by hand in black ink. The only television network was controlled by the central and/or state government telecasting infantile programs for a maximum of 2-4 hours per day. There was no color television in India until the middle of the 1990s. Bollywood productions were as popular then as now.

I had not even seen a computer (let alone used one) until I came to Northwestern University (NU) in 1983 as a visiting scholar at CISST. This is not saying that nobody then at NU was using computers at least for some of their office and academic work. But my five years there neither required nor encouraged me to use a computer. I was hooked on to my “desktop typewriter.” During the next five years at NU, I traveled to several Asian countries, including China and India, on behalf of the Science Policy Division of UNESCO in Paris. In the two “Asian superpowers” (as they are now called) nobody during the whole decade of the 1980s was using computers, cell phones or fax machines for any private, academic or government business, for none were available to them. In Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe, computer was not even in the vocabulary of government, industrial, scientific, or academic elites, let alone that of the common person. What is

most interesting is the fact that there were no computers or fax machines even at the UNESCO headquarters in Paris where I had to stop frequently for briefing and debriefing during those missions. Only telephones and telexes were used for short and long distance communications.<sup>1</sup>

In 1988, I relocated from Northwestern University to the Southern Technology Council (STC) in the Research Triangle Park, North Carolina. It was there that I learned to use—was rather forced to learn and use a computer for the first time in my life. At STC we used little Macs for word processing but had no email. Sometimes we would ask someone at some federal government agency, like the National Science Foundation (NSF) with whom we had professional connections, to use their very limited email system to convey our messages to some of our collaborators at the national laboratories or the NSF funded projects that also had minimal access to email. Telephone was still the main mode of long distance communication in the United States.

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<sup>1</sup> In the middle of 1986, I tried calling my home in Aligarh, India from Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan while my father lay critically ill. Despite week-long frantic efforts, even high level interventions from our Pakistani hosts, the call did not go through. Only after reaching home ten days later I found that my father had died while I was in Islamabad. Cell phones make that sound like the eighteenth century.

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1988 was also the year I got connected with Walden University (WU) as an adjunct faculty. Walden is a premier distance learning institute of higher education. For the next ten years since 1988 WU continued to process all student work in hard copies via the U.S. Postal service and later by the Federal Express or the UPS. These communications were supplemented by telephone conversations and face to face meetings in the residency programs, as they still do. There were no online courses until much later. Today WU is truly a virtual university serving nearly 40,000-50,000 students, faculty, and administrators all over the world with the help of a small laptop machine.

Walden University's experience with the Internet coincides well with the national experience. It was not until the late 1990s that the Internet technology came into wider use by all kinds of business, professional, and academic institutions, and subsequently reached home offices in Europe and America. The technological correlates of an interdependent world order were further galvanized with the advent of a little hand-held gadget, the cell (or mobile) phone that would make it possible

for political leaders, business executives, merchants, vendors, farmers, fishermen, policemen, truckers, bikers, hikers, and the kids in the industrialized world to connect with each other in the remotest places almost instantaneously. It would take another five to six years for the developing world to catch up with this emerging IT revolution.

As late or as early as 1998, I tried to check my email during a brief visit to North India using the only Internet facility in a town of half a million or more people at the computer science department of a major national university. Despite heroic efforts by the computer specialist present, we were unsuccessful to connect with my American email system. His expertise seemed superb, but his machines failed him miserably. India of today is one of the masterworks of computer technology in the developing world. It is that which has made India an increasingly attractive location for outsourcing and foreign investment by IT and other multinationals. This has happened despite India's proverbial bureaucracy and infrastructural malfunctions, and despite the large digital divide that still exists between its rich and poor, urban and rural-agricultural communities. Nonetheless, as the digital divide within and between nations narrows, more people around the world today are participating in the globalization of technology, economy, and cultures. This is both a reaffirmation of continuing dependency and backwardness in certain sections of the global community as well as that of a movement toward worldwide technoeconomic modernization. Which way this course of history would settle in the short and long runs depends upon how you look at it or who you ask.

By the time the decade of the 1990s dawned upon us, McLuhan's *The Global Village*, Club of Rome's *Limits to Growth* and *Mankind at the Turning Point*, and Toffler's *Third Wave* had already entered the world's intellectual scene.<sup>2</sup> They brought into sharper focus the emerging "brave new worlds" of microprocessors and satellites with all their promises and pitfalls, including the continuing digital divide between the haves and have-nots of the "global village." It was in that climate that my international interests began to naturally shift to the study of global society/globalization as these new vocabularies were just entering the literary circles. The time had come when national economies and regional and international development could no longer be seen outside the emerging global technoeconomic systems characterized by worldwide

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<sup>2</sup> Marshal McLuhan, *The Global Village: Transformations in World Life and Media in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989; Donella H. Meadows et al. *The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind*. New York: Universe Books, 1972; Mihajlo Mesorovic

and Eduard Pestel, *Mankind at the Turning Point: The Second Report to the Club of Rome*. New York: Dutton, 1974; Alvin Toffler, *Third Wave*. New York: Morrow, 1980.

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transfers of knowledge, brain power, and capital. That was the time when the European Economic Community (EC) and the other regional “free market”–North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), were taking shape. Freer markets were aiding and abetting not only the global economy and trade but also international trafficking in drugs and arms, and women and children along with them. Ethnic conflicts in distant lands–the Middle East, East Timor, Congo, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka–were spawning illegal arms trade on an unprecedented scale. Terrorism was becoming more of an international rather than a national threat further dramatized by the 9/11/2001 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C.

That was also the time when the American higher education began to turn its belated attention to globalization of undergraduate curricula all across the board. In that climate I took a small step in that direction in the Sociology Department at the University of North Carolina–Greensboro (UNCG). I launched two undergraduate courses, Global Society and Global Deviance that addressed some of these emerging global concerns. They were taught regularly every year for a decade, Global Society from 1995 through 2005 and Global Deviance from 1998 until the fall of 2005. These efforts were duly informed by the graduate and undergraduate courses and seminars in international management and technology transfer I had taught in the 1980s and 1990s at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Stuart School of Business Administration, IIT Chicago, Love School of Business, Elon University, the Bryan School of Business at UNC Greensboro, and later at the residency sessions of Walden University’s School of Management. They had heightened my awareness about the ups and downs of globalization’s impacts on national economies and societies. For example, my association with Kellogg Graduate School’s Small Business Development Program in the mid eighties brought me face to face with the hardships experienced by numerous small- and medium-sized businesses in the Chicago metropolitan area due to cheap and not always of better quality imports from Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. China as a global trader was not yet on the scene. But for me that was the first time dawning of what global economy really meant. This project on *Exploring Globalization* has been motivated, encouraged, and inspired by the above experiences.

## **A CRITIQUE OF EXTANT GLOBALIZATION**

## LITERATURE

As indicated earlier, there is no dearth of literature on the subject of globalization today. But with few exceptions, such as Manfred Steger's, *Globalization: A Very Short Introduction*, the literature generally deals only with some aspect(s) of globalization, primarily the global economy perspective, without providing a comprehensive definition, classification, and analysis of the contemporary world society as a large system of interlocking and interdependent subsystems.<sup>3</sup> There are other problems with this literature as well. Instead of providing an unbiased and factual analysis of the phenomenon itself, it is generally a polemical discussion of what may be right or wrong with global society/globalization. For the sake of this discussion, the globalization research front can conveniently be divided into anti- or pro-globalization treatments (they may even be called scholarly lobbies). They are represented, for examples, by seminal early works of Joseph Stiglitz, Charles Derber, Leslie Sklair, and George Ritzer presenting a highly critical view of globalization as neoliberal capitalism and its largely negative environmental, social, and economic impacts on world societies, particularly on the newly emerging Asian, African and Latin American societies following the western modes of technoeconomic

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<sup>3</sup> Manfred B. Steger. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

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development.<sup>4</sup> Responding to these critics of globalization, more favorable treatments of the phenomenon began to emerge later, including by Stiglitz himself and others like Jagdish Bhagwati, Martin Wolf, and Pete Engardio as rebuttals to not only the anti-globalization movement but also reflecting the experiences of the emerging powerhouses of globalization--the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China).<sup>5</sup> The line taken by anti-globalization rhetoric condemns the very idea itself for two primary reasons: Globalization, which for them meant global economy, *per se*, is nothing more than expansion of capitalism at the expense of the natural environment and the world's poor and the powerless. Furthermore, with this expansion comes denigration of local cultures and destruction of nascent industries in the less developed countries. The proponents, representing the corporate and World Bank interests on the other hand, see globalization (meaning the global economy again), as the panacea for the ills of the world caused by misdistribution of global resources--a situation that can be corrected by globalization alone. For them, the only problem with globalization is that there is not enough of it. For these true believers the real problems are that the markets are not free enough, political institutions are not

democratic enough, technology systems used are backward,

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<sup>4</sup> Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and its Discontents*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2002; Charles Derber, *People before Profit*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2002; Leslie Sklair, *Globalization: Capitalism and its Alternatives*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002; George Ritzer, *McDonaldization of Society*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1996.

<sup>5</sup> For example, see Jagdish Bhagwati, *In Defense of Globalization*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004; Marin Wolf, *Why Globalization Works*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; Joseph Stiglitz, *Making Globalization Work*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2006; and Pete Engardio (Ed.), *Chindia: How China and India are Revolutionizing Global Business*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007.

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and cultures are not modern or western enough to absorb and implement the largess of globalization. They see, poverty, inequality, unemployment, human degradation, even tyranny and oppression as the consequences of insufficient economic and political modernization, and insufficient or inefficient use of modern information, manufacturing, service, and management technologies across the world.

This dichotomous treatment of globalization literature is, however, not entirely accurate. A third position of neutrality is also out there pointing out both the negative and positive, dismissive and permissive views of the emerging technoeconomic and cultural global trends and the hype about them. Three works known to me fall into this category of literature, although undoubtedly several others may also qualify. Alex McGillivray's *A Brief History of Globalization* stands out for discussing long-term historical developments of some important aspects of economic, cultural, and demographic globalizations.<sup>6</sup> Held & McGrew lucidly alert us about both the pros and cons of globalization--a good lesson for those who want to develop a better understanding of the globalization/anti-globalization debate as off shoots of contending political ideologies.<sup>7</sup> *Bound Together* by Nayan Chandra is an excellent and expansive complement to MacGillivray's historical journey of globalization through the ages. Chandra traces the roots of globalization "across continents and millennia" to the very beginning of human societies on the African continent and the earliest migrations of people from there in search of water, food and pastures in other parts of the planet.<sup>8</sup>

There is another type of myopia in the academic debate between the proponents and opponents of globalization in

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<sup>6</sup> Alex MacGillivray, *A Brief History of Globalization*. New York: Carroll & Graff Publishers, 2006.

7 David Held & Anthony McGrew, *Globalization/Anti-Globalization*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2002.

8 Nayan Chandra, *Bound Together*. New Haven: CT: Yale University Press, 2007.

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the western literature that must also be noted. The pros and cons of globalization are debated from the vantage points of political economy of advanced industrial societies and their multinational corporations regardless of the political and economic roles and interests of other nations in how they might define the origins and impacts of globalization in view of their own perspectives and priorities. Ignoring its historical and cross-cultural antecedents and influences acknowledged by a few scholars noted above, the good, bad and ugly of globalization in much of the existing literature is treated as if it is solely engineered by the western countries, notably the United States of America, starting with the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions in 1944. The rest of the world is projected as puppets dancing to the tunes played by the western corporate world.<sup>9,10</sup>

These perceptions are, however, beginning to change due to the rapidly rising newly industrializing large and small countries on every continent. But here as well, the frame of reference or the driving force behind globalization is assumed to be entirely western/American. A good example of this tendency is Tom Friedman's best seller, *The World is Flat*, touting the massive sweep of information technology in India.<sup>11</sup> Friedman's "ten flatteners" and the "triple convergence" responsible for flattening the world are all unabashedly American creations. The misfortune of the unflat and half-flat worlds is supposed to be not following the principles embodied in these flatteners and convergences. Reality seems to suggest otherwise.

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9 See for example, Stiglitz, Ritzer, Derber, and others op.cit. footnote 3.

10 George Ritter's later commentary, *The Globalization of Nothing* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publication, 2004) also falls into this category of literature.

11 *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006.

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Of course the power of new information technology to bring the world closer and make it more interconnected and interdependent is unquestionable. But technological progress by itself has never helped flatten or level the playing field. The history of technology reveals that unless otherwise managed through public

policy, technological innovations tend to accentuate inequalities by being inaccessible to the under-privileged, at least in the initial stages. That is what seems to be happening with new IT in the age of globalization, so uncritically glamorized by Mr. Friedman.<sup>12</sup> Manfred Steger's work cited above also has its own limitations. First, this "very short introduction to globalization" is just that: a valuable, quite readable but really a very short summary of the key dimensions of globalization for a beginner. Second, the reader is struck by the fact that the book starts with Osama bin-Laden's high-tech assisted message to the world on the eve of the American invasion of Taliban run Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, as if that was critical to understanding the force of digital technology in the age of globalization. For people outside the United States this example of digitalization may not appear all that meaningful next to the ability of many small farmers in less developed countries to instantaneously obtain weather forecasts.<sup>13</sup>

Another self-centered view of globalization is projected by the variety of American scholars, businessmen, and political lobbies who tend to look at the rising non-American economies and other forces of globalization, such as outsourcing and labor immigrations, as threats to "us"—our political power,

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12 Aqueil Ahmad, "The World is (Not) Flat – A Critique of Tom Friedman's *The World is Flat*." *Globalization*, Special Issue 2007. <[http://globalization.icaap.org/current issue. php](http://globalization.icaap.org/current%20issue.php)>

13 Steger, op.cit.

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economy, and standards of living, with scant attention paid to what these might mean to "them."<sup>14</sup> There is no question, for example, that off shore manufacturing and service sector outsourcing has drained out many American jobs causing hardships to working class families. But they are undoubtedly helping the economies of the countries at the receiving ends of these opportunities, the argument about corporate exploitation of cheap resources overseas notwithstanding. The global economy is indeed a double-edged weapon and so should it be examined and explained.

## **WHAT IS SO DIFFERENT ABOUT THIS DISCOURSE ON GLOBALIZATION?**

Well, it attempts to correct some of the problems in globalization literature and debate identified above. For example, while discussing the historical roots of globalization, it is important to take into account non-western influences that have shaped

and reshaped globalization through time–influences that may easily escape the attention of a common person in Europe and America. Books like Chanda’s voluminous *Bound Together* that highlight such influences are generally neither accessible nor recommended for an average college student or lay-scholar anywhere.

On balance, it should be equally important to consider how globalization might be adversely affecting small businesses in Europe and America as it helps their counterparts elsewhere.

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14 For this line of thinking, check the following sources: Jeffrey A. Bader, “China’s Emergence and its Implications for the United States.” Presentation to the Brookings Council (The Brookings Institution), February 14, 2006 <<http://www.brookings.edu/views/speeches/bader/20060214.htm>>; “The Strength of China, the Weakness of America.” *The New York Times*, Monday, June 27, 2005; Tom Barry, “The Expanding Anti-Immigration Bandwagon.” International Relations Center <<http://rightweb.irc-online.org/rw/3426>>

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Traditional textile and furniture industries in the states of North Carolina and Virginia in the United States are good examples; alongside how globalization might be augmenting economic development and the prospects of a better life for \$1-5 a day workers in the so-called sweat shops of China, Mexico, and Bangladesh. Protection of the natural environment is an absolute necessity for the future of mankind. But so is the necessity of mass education, faster communication, and rapid industrialization for the impoverished of the world using the resources and opportunities made available by the forces of globalization.

The issue, therefore, is not globalization or no globalization or more or less globalization. Neither is it a contest between globalization versus localization. Whether one likes it or not, globalization is the wave of the future, despite the recent economic meltdown due to oversupply of money and its wanton misuse by many. The meltdown itself underscores that the economies of the world, and consequently its people and social structures, are highly interconnected. They have to learn to interact effectively with each other, regulate and deregulate as necessary to make it work for the benefit of global community as a whole. Interestingly, the anti-globalization lobby has already written its premature obituary although not much has changed during the global recession to suggest anything otherwise. And further, as noted above, globalization is not just the global economy.

Those are the concerns that undergird this work and how it looks at globalization—holistically and non-polemically, to the extent possible, tracing its historical and crosscultural roots, highlighting both its negative and positive consequences, suggesting what might or might not work for all concerned, and what may need to be avoided or embraced. Both the promises and pitfalls of globalization reside in the interactive nature of an increasingly interdependent information age world society faced at the same time with the specter of a schismatic international order marred by political and ethnic conflicts, economic disparities, and environmental nightmares of the worst kind, some of which are undoubtedly the direct or indirect consequences of globalization but all of which are avoidable in the interest of a common purpose.

There is another very important distinction between this work and the other treatments of globalization that needs to be stressed at the outset. It looks at globalization from two angles. One confronts its material, the practical and physical reality in terms of what is/might be going on in terms of its social and economic impacts. This is the angle most prevalent in the current globalization literature. This angle is particularly prominent in the study of global economy in both its positive and negative treatments. It includes the commercial side of globalization or globalism which basically means globalization of capital, manufacturing, and marketing for expanding the economic power and the bottom lines of multinational corporations--the easy targets of anti-globalizers.<sup>15</sup> The other angle which is generally neglected is the social-psychological side of globalization I call global consciousness.<sup>16</sup> From this angle, globalization is seen as an attitude of mind about living prudently and harmoniously in an interdependent world with finite natural resources contradicted by infinite sources of exploitation of nature, violence, conflicts, self-interest, and a world divided between us and them. These contradictions are assumed to be the consequences of globalization without a global consciousness.

Globalism promotes a mercantile mentality and looks at the world in terms of its value for profit, exploitation, and plunder. It promotes borderless markets for foreign investments

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15 See, for example, John Gray, *False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism*. London, UK: Granta Books, 1998; Joseph Stiglitz, "Globalism's Discontents." *The American Prospect*, 13, 1, January 1-14 2000.

16 Aqueil Ahmad, "Globalization, Without Global Consciousness." *Humanity & Society*, 27, 2, May 2003, 125-142.

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and profits following western political and economic models. Its motto: "Let the "unflat world" be molded into the image of the "flat (western) world," and we should see an age of prosperity and happiness all around us.<sup>17</sup> Global consciousness says, "Wait a minute. We are all in it together. The global community cannot be sustained by playing one against the other, one at the expense of the other, by the law of "survival of the fittest." The metaphor of "globalization without global consciousness" sees an inner contradiction in the concept and processes of globalization itself, in that the material side of globalization is emphasized and proceeds unabated while its cultural correlates at the level of individual and collective consciousness are ignored and absent. This contradiction is the source of the darker sides of globalization so much decried by its opponents without identifying its conceptual root cause. The idea of global consciousness is an offshoot of the notion of "cosmic consciousness," "the universal mind," or the "universal man" proposed by an Indian philosopher, poet, Nobel Laureate, saint and savant Rabindranath Tagore in the early part of the twentieth century.<sup>18</sup> Close to one hundred years ago, before the Nazis, the Fascists, the Stalinists, the atomic bombs, the Cold War, the atrocities in Congo, Eastern Europe, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Tagore could lament the human condition marred by violence and injustice and attribute it to parochialism, nationalism, and religious and cultural bigotry, in short, to a serious lack of what he called cosmic consciousness as elaborated by one of his biographers:

As Tagore's vision and sympathies grew, he increasingly recognized that while one's own native culture has an immediate appeal and

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<sup>17</sup> Friedman, op.cit.

<sup>18</sup> Humayun Kabir (Ed.), *Rabindranath Tagore: Towards Universal Man*. New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1961; Aqueil Ahmad, "Can Science Lead the Way? - Profile of the Universal Man." *Journal of Human Relations*, 20: 14-29, 1972.

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value, it must find its place in the wider synthesis of a truly universal civilization.<sup>19</sup>

This rather mystical sounding notion of cosmic consciousness converted into a practical program of promoting global consciousness is of great value in contemporary world societies. It sees greed and selfishness as the engines that drive the darker sides of globalization without much concern for humanity to which we can all relate as citizens of the world and work towards its welfare using the vast opportunities and resources opening up through globalization. Global consciousness is the attitude of mind that may help humanize globalization.

As long as people continue to see themselves irreconcilably different from each other, globalization will fail to deliver its promise and there will not be a viable global society with peace and justice for all. <sup>20</sup> Commenting upon the “clash of civilization” thesis, Edward Said was more eloquent:

“The clash of civilization” thesis is a gimmick like the “war of the worlds,” better for reinforcing defensive self-pride than for critical understanding of the bewildering interdependence of our time.<sup>21</sup>

And lastly, in the spirit of this brief reference to Tagore, the insight and information for this book are drawn, to the extent possible, from both the western and non-western thought relevant to the subject of globalization for both its antecedents and contemporary correlates, as they were for Tagore’s cosmic “consciousness” of his “universal man.”

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19 Kabir, 1961, op cit. pp. 32-33.

20 Ahmad, “Globalization without Global Consciousness,” op.cit. p. 132.

21 Edward Said, “The Clash of Ignorance,” *The Nation*, October 22: 11-13, 2001.

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## **ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK**

The Introduction/Preface is followed by seven chapters organized as follows: The first chapter lays down the conceptual framework for the Study of globalization superimposed on the definition, classification, analysis, and explanation of the structure and processes of globalization. It is informed by the concepts, assumptions and propositions of systems theory and two contradictory theoretical formulations—modernization theory or theories and the World Systems/dependency theory (WST). Undoubtedly, these are not the only frameworks that can explain and enlighten globalization as a process of worldwide social change. But they seem to fittingly explain the contradictory treatments of globalization’s impacts by its opponents and proponents mentioned above. Other theoretical schemes, such as conflict theory, structural-functionalism, social Darwinism, neo liberalism, and symbolic interaction are also invoked where appropriate. Chapter 2 deals with Global Population and Demographic Trends through the framework of demographic transition theory, assuming that demographic change is closely intertwined with general socioeconomic economic change. Population fluctuations can be considered both as the cause

and effect of socioeconomic change. The long evolutionary history of world population turning into an “explosion” during the past one hundred or so years is considered a primary source of contemporary global change; and hence it’s up front treatment in this book.

Chapter 3 discusses the basic structures and functions of global economy/economic globalization, including the Bretton Woods institutions, old and newer free trade zones, globalization of capital, and the nature of multinational corporations and their international manufacturing and business networks. It also includes separate sections on Global Economy Contradictions, the Culture of Consumerism, the Underground Global Economy (dug trade, illegal arms trade, and trafficking in women and children), followed by a brief discussion of the ABC of Managing Business in the Global Economy.

Chapter 4 is about Global Environmental/Ecological Issues, including global nutritional and public health problems as consequences of global economy, political choices, and lifestyles.

Chapter 5 describes Global Political Institutions or Political Globalization. It includes the structures and processes of mega international organizations like the United Nations, the European Union, and the British Commonwealth, along with similar discussions of their numerous affiliates that encompass global society as a whole.

The next chapter (6) is a brief analysis of the causes and consequences of Global Conflicts, pointing out how the global economy and politics—for examples, the foreign policy of nations, arms and drug trades, and failure of national and international political institutions to resolve them perpetuate these conflicts.

The last chapter is on Global Cultures or Cultural Globalization. It is the largest chapter in the book, divided into three comprehensive sections: Globalization of Lifestyles deemed the softer side of globalization; Globalization of Science, Technology, and Knowledge; and World Religions. Each section ends with a summary of main points. Further reflection and suggestions for discussion of some of the key points in the entire chapter are provided in the chapter summary in line with summaries of the earlier chapters. This macro-analysis provides an overview of the emerging global society as an imperfect system displaying strong systemic qualities, rather than an in-depth analysis of any one of its components or subsystems. Such details are available in countless other sources which are cited throughout the

text to construct a composite, all inclusive picture. To the extent possible, system and subsystem interconnections and interdependence are highlighted to make the central point of this analysis: **that there indeed is a new world order emerging, being superimposed on local and parochial identities and prerogatives and pointing to our common destiny as the human race.**